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Summary:2 
 
This paper assesses the innovation capacities of the central and east European (CEE) 
candidate countries and the countries of the EU using a set of 25 indicators organized 
within the national innovation capacity (NIC) framework. Based on regression and 
cluster analysis the paper shows that NIC in the enlarged EU does not follow a simple 
‘East – West’ divide. The wider Europe is structured into three groups of countries and 
CEE countries are fall into two, the less developed and medium developed EU, groups. 
NICs in the enlarged EU are assessed across four dimensions of capacity: absorptive, 
R&D, diffusion and demand. In each of these dimensions we observe a two- or three-
tiering of countries, which goes beyond a simple ‘East’ – ‘ West’ pattern. The results of 
this assessment have important implications for candidate countries as well as for the EU 
policy towards structural assistance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
With the progress in institutional transformation of central and east European 
countries (CEECs) transition issues have become secondary to growth, structural change 
and employment. The pre-accession activities of CEE candidate countries have further 
highlighted competitiveness issues and the capability of these economies to withstand the 
competitive pressures of the Single Market. Underpinning these concerns are concerns 
about productivity, technical change, innovation and R&D in CEECs. Analysis of R&D 
activities in CEECs suggests that sources of growth in these countries during the 1990s 
have not been directly linked to these activities (Radosevic and Auriol, 1999). Growth 
during the 1990s seems to be better explained as the outcome of a combination of initial 
conditions and reform policies rather than by growth determinants related to capital and 
technology accumulation (see Campos and Corriceli, 2002 for an overview). The 
technological upgrading that has taken place has not been linked to the R&D system but 
rather to the acquisition of knowledge in the production process and through different 
forms of firm based learning (Dyker and Radosevic, 1999). 
 Further continuous and high growth is essential if CEECs are to resolve an 
accumulation of social and environmental problems, to increase standards of living and to 
improve social and economic cohesion within the enlarged EU, all of which will require 
continuous increases in productivity, which are unlikely to materialize without 
technology accumulation and the building of a knowledge-based economy. Given their 
income levels, the CEECs have still relatively large numbers of research scientist and 
engineers (RSE) and many have a favourable education structure. Both these factors 
should, according to new growth theory, produce much more robust growth than was 
observed during the 1990s. Yet, recovery of the CEECs during the 1990s was unrelated 
to their R&D.4  
 The failure of the majority of the CEECs to grow according to expectations is 
usually attributed in part to differences among countries in their reform process, i.e. 
transition process. However, during the last 10 years these economies have established 
market economy institutions and most have achieved the EU designation of a 
                                                
3 Reader, University College London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, Email: 
s.radosevic@ssees.ac.uk  
4 Simple correlation coefficients between growth of GDP and share of GERD/GDP for 1992-1999 period 
are negative for six out of nine CEE economies. 
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‘functioning market economy’. However, this by itself does not automatically mean there 
will be an increase in productivity and that growth will occur.  
Growth is a complex and highly idiosyncratic process based on a particular 
interaction between incentives, institutions and capabilities. In an increasingly integrated 
world economy, growth differences increasingly seem to be rooted in micro rather than 
macro-economic differences, and to depend on a variety of dimensions such as 
technology, public institutions, etc (Porter, 1990). There is a general consensus among 
economists that technological innovation plays a central role in the process of long-run 
economic growth. However, there are a wide variety of approaches when it comes to 
understanding the underlying drivers of growth and the innovation process itself. 
Innovation studies show that innovation does not result solely from the supply of R&D 
(see Freeman and Soete, 1997 for an overview). The exclusive focus in new growth 
theory on ‘knowledge stocks’ and on the pool of R&D labour is far from being sufficient 
to understand what is the potential of the CEE for growth based on R&D and innovation. 
In order to understand the key issues behind country differences in growth and 
technology we have to organize an analysis within a multi-dimensional framework, i.e. 
one that captures several important dimensions – all of which determine innovation 
capacity.  
 In this paper we try to assess the R&D and innovation capacity of the CEECs 
within a systems of innovation framework using a set of 25 quantitative indicators 
organized within the national innovation capacity (NIC) framework. We try to answer 
three particular questions. First, whether levels of productivity of the CEE/EU countries 
are dependent on NIC and its components? Second, what are the levels of NICs in 
CEECs compared to the EU? Third, what are the specific strengths and weaknesses of the 
CEECs’ innovation capacities? 
 The paper is organized in five sections. In the next section, we review the 
different approaches that have been used to analyze relationships between productivity, 
R&D and innovation and explain the elements of the national innovation capacity (NIC) 
framework. Section three describes the data sources and methodology. Section four 
presents the results of the analysis and section five discusses these results and outlines 
some policy implications deriving from the analysis. 
 
2. PRODUCTIVITY, R&D AND INNOVATION: COMPETING FRAMEWORKS 
 
The ultimate measure of the competitiveness and growth of an economy is its 
productivity (Porter, 1990). Intuitively we know that growth in productivity should be 
linked to technology. However, economists find it difficult to show how technology 
affects productivity and then growth.  
The neo-classical theory of growth (Solow, Swain) does not consider sources of 
technology but simply assumes that technology effects are those that cannot be ascribed 
to growth of capital and population. Early growth accounting exercises, which are based 
on this approach, ascribed most growth to residual or multi-factor productivity.5 
                                                
5 Efficient allocation of resources is an alternative source of growth, which seems to play important role in 
technological innovation and technology diffusion as drivers of productivity growth. For example, Scarptea 
et al. (2002) quotes Haltiwanger (1997, 2000) who reports that for the United States manufacturing sector, 
roughly half of multi-factor productivity growth over the course of a decade can be accounted for by the re-
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However, improved measurements of capital and labour have shown that the rate of 
growth based on residual productivity has declined significantly.  
Economists often tend to equate productivity growth with technology. Based on 
this assumption the measurement of technical change is reduced to the measurement of 
multi-factor productivity growth whereas, in reality, neither technology, nor technical 
change necessarily translates into productivity. For example, diffusion of information 
technology (IT) may not necessarily be reflected in productivity (cf. the so-called Solow 
paradox). Alternatively, productivity is not necessarily the result of technical change but 
may derive from economies of scale, cyclical effects or measurement errors. In addition, 
productivity indices tend to ascribe too much of growth to capital, and neglect the 
induced effect from previous growth driven by technology to the current contribution of 
capital (OECD, 2002, p. 112, 113). However, the major weakness in the total factor 
productivity (TFP) approach is that it is not appropriate to consider physical capital, 
human capital and technology as separate factors. Metaphorically speaking, the TFP 
approach assumes that the secret of producing a good cake lies in finding out its 
ingredients and their weights. However, historical evidence suggests that instead of an 
exclusive focus on ‘stocks’ we should give much more attention to interactions, 
composition and structures, i.e. ‘flow’ factors. 
New growth theory has resolved, at least in modeling terms, the exogenous nature 
of technical progress of the Solow model where growth materializes through the 
imposition of a productivity parameter. Rather in contrast, new growth theory introduces 
some structural features like size of the R&D sector or rate of obsolescence of new 
knowledge, which determine long-run growth (see Aghion and Howitt, 1998 for an 
overview).  
Due to the specific nature of R&D, which is a non-rival and partially excludable 
good, it is central to the production of knowledge. The theory assumes that there is an 
‘ideas generating sector’ (R&D) which, in interaction with demand for R&D by 
innovators, generate innovations. Within this framework, ‘ideas production’ is 
determined by the number of workers devoted to ‘ideas production’ and the existing 
stock of ideas from which these workers can draw in their ‘ideas production’ work. By 
changing the number of researchers working in ‘ideas production’ and shifting the 
productivity of production of new ideas, technical change becomes endogenous.  
The advantage of new growth theory is that it throws light on the process of R&D 
supply and also in part on the process of absorption of R&D results. In the context of 
                                                                                                                                            
allocation of outputs and inputs away from less productive to more productive businesses (p. 116). 
However, we should bear in mind that it is difficult to separate reallocations (its sources and effects) from 
accumulated technology and innovation. This may be the reason why for the CEECs, the effect of 
relocations, does not seem to be strong. For Former Soviet Union countries, De Broeck and Koen (2000) 
show that the contribution of sectoral composition to changes in total factor productivity were positive in 
the early transition but their effect was small, indicating that sectoral input reallocations did not have a 
major impact on productivity (p. 20). In CEE the process of structural change has been very strong but the 
main sources of productivity growth were not sectoral reallocations but intra-sectoral reallocations. 
Research on six Central European countries shows that the sectoral content of the productivity gap with the 
EU is low and varies between 27.7% in Slovakia to 5.3% in Czech R (Stephan, 2002). Hence, most of the 
productivity gap derives from intra-sectoral differences or differences in technology, management and 
organisation. This result has also been confirmed by a large scale enterprise survey conducted by Carlin et 
al. (2001) who conclude that the major sources of productivity growth in transition economies are not inter- 
but intra-sectoral reallocations. 
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CEE, new growth theory can illuminate several issues. For example, the factors that 
affect the number of research scientists and engineers (RSEs) and demand for R&D. How 
the obsolescence of R&D knowledge from the past affects the current productivity of 
R&D sector. How the rigidity of intellectual property rights affects the generation of new 
ideas vs. their absorption or diffusion.  
A recent exploration by Verspagen (2001) of the determinants of growth in the 
OECD countries suggests that the concerns of new growth theory are becoming 
increasingly relevant. Verspagen (2001) found that in the last 10 to 20 years R&D has 
become a crucial part of the catching up strategy, i.e. R&D is no longer associated only 
with the world technology frontier. Second, differences among countries in terms of 
‘pure’ technology competitiveness (patents) are becoming more and more important in 
explaining growth differences.  
At an aggregate level, R&D expenditures tend to show a statistically significant 
relationship to productivity growth, but only explain a relatively small part of overall 
annual movements in multi-factor productivity. This indicates the presence of other 
factors (OECD, 2002, p. 113). 
However, as pointed out by the EC (2002b) the supply of R&D is only a part of 
the overall process of innovation that leads to a finished product being placed on the 
market or to economic growth at the national level. The degree of technology and 
knowledge flows across public and private sectors strongly affects the impact of 
technology on the economy (OECD, 2002b). So, if we want to understand the effects of 
R&D and innovation on productivity we must look beyond the R&D sector to the 
diffusion of knowledge and new technologies. 
R&D spillovers, transfer and diffusion are not automatic. Innovation studies have 
recognized the complex web of relationships that exist between the R&D system and 
innovation and growth (Freeman and Soete, 1997; Perez, 2002). The complexity arises 
from the institutional context in which innovative firms operate (Nelson, 1993; Lundvall, 
1992, Edquist, 1999). The effectiveness of the innovation process may be affected by the 
quality of the organizational structures and networks in the economy (von Tunzelmann, 
1995; Porter, 1990). All this points to the importance of national systems of innovation 
and, in an increasingly integrated world economy, of local systems of innovation. For 
example, the evidence suggests that international knowledge spillovers tend to be smaller 
than domestic spillovers, which demonstrates the importance of national non-market 
linkages for growth (Sanghoon and Hemmings, 2000, p.21).  
Within this approach the competitiveness and productivity of an economy means 
much more than high market share or efficient and low cost firms (Porter et al., 2002). 
Externalities and network linkages between firms and sectors are producing outcomes 
that are difficult to explain by aggregate variables. Approaches based on aggregate 
variables are uni-dimensional and thus run contra to the multi-level and multi-
dimensional nature of growth and technical change. Overly aggregate approaches, which, 
for example, measure contributions of different factors like R&D to productivity growth 
(to paraphrase Grilliches, 1997), only shift the problem to a new set of questions. 
Whether or not there was investment in R&D and where do improvements in contribution 
of R&D come from? 
On the other hand, overly disaggregated approaches to understanding the 
underlying causes of growth, innovation and productivity change, which are usually 
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institutional, historical, and case study approaches, often have limitations in terms of their 
generality and wider relevance.  
Obviously, these different approaches have to be complemented. In this case, we 
pursue an intermediate line by employing a large number of indicators within a system of 
innovation framework (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Edquist, 1997). The increasing 
availability of data has made this approach very popular, in particular because of its use 
of composite indicators based on a large amount of data that measure different 
components of growth, technology and competitiveness. Examples are Porter and 
colleagues’ approach to calculating Current Competitiveness and the Growth 
Competitiveness indexes (Porter et al., 2002), the EU Innovation Scoreboard EC (2001; 
2002), the EU Enterprise Scoreboard (CEC, 2000), the UNDP (2002) measurement of 
human development index, and UNIDO’s (2002) competitive industrial performance 
index. All these approaches combine a variety of different indicators, which should be 
able to capture different dimensions of the phenomena and aggregate them into 
composite indicator. 
The most problematic stage in this approach is aggregation. In calculating their 
Current Competitiveness Index Porter et al. (2002) combine the individual micro 
dimensions of competitiveness using common factor analysis to provide a single 
composite proxy of the relative microeconomic competitiveness of each country. The 
Growth Competitiveness Index is a composite measure of the quality of public 
institutions, the macroeconomic environment and technology, with each of these 
elements weighted depending whether they relate to technologically advanced (core 
innovators) or follower (non-core) countries. Each of these components is a combination 
of several subindexes. For example, the technology index for non-core economies 
comprises 1/8 of the innovation subindex + 3/8 technology transfer subindex + ½ ICT 
subindex. Each of these subindexes is in turn a combination of hard and soft (survey 
based) data. 
When calculating the competitiveness of transition economies Zinnes, Eilat and 
Sachs (2001) use seven subindicators (openness, technology, good government, 
infrastructure, the financial sector, labour market and institutions). With the exception of 
technology, labour and infrastructure indicators, because of the smaller availability of 
data, they are given equal weights. They defend the use of prior weights rather than 
weights derived through factor or principal component analysis by arguing that ‘all 
economic variables are inherently conceptual, artificial constructs defined only in terms 
of their data definitions’ (p. 323). 
UNIDO’s (2002) Competitive Industrial Performance Index is a simple average of 
the four standardized basic indicators with no weights assigned (Manufacturing value 
added per capita, Manufactured exports per capita, Share of medium and high-tech 
activities and Share of medium and high tech products in manufactured exports). 
Similarly, Campos (2000) measures the impact of institutions on growth in 25 
transition economies by using four indicators for different institutional dimensions of 
‘governance’ and aggregating them by simple averaging. Each of the four indicators is 
constructed based on an aggregation of several other indicators. 
Aggregation has the advantage that it summarizes large sets of dimensions into 
one number This allows countries to be ranked and causes of differences to be sought in 
individual indexes and subindexes. However, the more complex the composite indicator 
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the less useful it is as a learning and analytical tool for understanding reality and drawing 
policy implications. For example, the EU innovation scoreboard is moderately useful in 
its aggregate form, but its individual indicators grouped into four groups (human capital, 
knowledge generation, knowledge diffusion, output and markets) can be very revealing. 
A second problem, which is not unique to this methodological approach, is the 
conversion of theoretical concepts or frameworks into specific indicators. For example, 
Ziness, Eilat and Sachs (2001) adopt as a technology index the number of fax machines 
per 100 persons, vehicles per 1000 persons and Internet hosts per capita giving them the 
respective weights of 0.2, 0.2 and 0.6. Elsewhere, identical indicators are used to denote 
either supply or demand aspects.  
In a nutshell, the value of this approach rests on its conceptual framework, which 
organizes different indicators. If the conceptual framework is robust, theoretically and 
empirically, and if individual components represent individual, preferably, hard data then 
this approach can be relevant, both from an academic and from a policy perspective.  
In what follows, similar to Porter et al. (2002), and EC (2002; 2001), we look 
beyond R&D to understand innovation capacity. Following the national innovation 
system approach we organize the indicators into four groups (R&D supply, absorptive 
capacity, diffusion and demand). Growth and innovation capacity of an economy depend 
not only on the supply of R&D but also on the capability to absorb and diffuse 
technology and on the demand for its generation and utilization. Figure 1 graphically 
presents four elements of the innovation capacity conceptual framework. Individual 
elements of the framework are interrelated and, in aggregation, they produce the national 
innovation capacity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Absorptive capacity is the ability to absorb new knowledge and adapt imported 
technologies (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). This capability is essential if catching-up 
economies are to grow and innovate. R&D capability is important not only to generate 
new knowledge but also as a mechanism to absorb it (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
Diffusion is the key mechanism for reaping economic benefits from investment in R&D 
and for increasing absorptive capacities (Davies, 1979). Demand for R&D and innovation 
is the key economic mechanism that initiates wealth generation processes in R&D, 
absorption and diffusion activities (Easterly, 2002). 
          National innovation capacity framework
Absorptive capacity
R&D supply Diffusion and linkages
Demand (market pull)
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 This conceptual framework does not differ substantially from the approaches 
already mentioned. It builds on the results of innovation and competitiveness studies. 
However, we believe that its simplicity, variables which proxy individual elements 
together with their availability, make this approach robust and relevant, both 
academically and in policy terms.  
 
 
3. DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The analysis is based on a series of 25 indicators compiled for 10 CEE candidate 
countries and 14 EU countries. These data are classified into the four groups of the NIC 
framework (see figure 1 and table 1).  
Two criteria were used in the selection of indicators; first, relevance to the 
analysis and, second, availability.  
Indicators of absorptive capacity are human capital indicators related to education 
and lifelong learning combined with the share of employment in medium-high tech 
industries and services. The first four indicators describe the education and learning 
aspects of absorptive capacity. Employment in medium-high tech industries and services 
indicate the potential for catch up, which is easier if economies are specialized in 
technology intensive sectors. 
Indicators of R&D supply include R&D expenditures, personnel and three types 
of patent outputs.6 Indicators of diffusion include the share of enterprises that undertake 
training, the costs of vocational training in the labour costs of all enterprises, ISO9000 
standards per capita, PC and Internet per capita and share of the ICT market in GDP.  
Demand is proxied by three groups of indicators: finance, competition and 
macroeconomic stability. The share of the stock market in GDP and the share of domestic 
credit provided by the banking sector proxy the level of development of the financial 
system. We assume that the more developed the financial system the better it can 
articulate demand for innovation, given equality of technological opportunities. Share of 
trade and foreign direct investments (FDI) in GDP are used as proxies for the intensity of 
competition together with the index of patent rights. Usually, FDI are taken as a proxy for 
supply of capital and technology. However, in the case of CEE they primarily act as 
agents that radically change the domestic market and industry structure with competition 
enhancing but also competition reducing effects. In all CEECs, with the possible 
exception of Hungary, FDI are dominantly market-seeking which means that their 
competition effects are pronounced. However, competition does not affect productivity 
and innovation in a direct and easily measurable way.  
The index of patent rights is constructed by Ginarte and Park (1996). The G-P 
index is constructed as a scoreboard of five features of patent protection: (1) extent of 
coverage; (2) membership in international patent agreements; (3) provisions for loss of 
                                                
6 Elsewhere (for example, EC, 2002b), patents are used as proxy for demand for R&D. By taking patents as 
a proxy for demand we assume that the supply of knowledge and finance is unlimited and that only 
incentives (intensity of protection rights) and technological opportunities determine the demand for new 
technology. We consider that for our purposes this is a rather heroic assumption and we use patents as 
proxy for R&D supply. As one of seven variables on the demand side, we use the index of patent rights 
constructed by Ginarte and Pack (1997).  
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protection; (4) enforcement mechanism; and (5) duration of protection. Each of these 
categories is broken into several sub-components and weighted in such a way that each 
category ranges in value from 0 to 1. These categories are summed as unweighted 
components so the index value ranges from zero to five. Higher values of the index 
indicate stronger levels of protection.7 However, the index does not show the degree to 
which intellectual property rights (IPR) laws are enforced and IPRs are actually 
implemented, which should be taken into consideration when interpreting data. 
Smarzynska (2002) has developed an index that takes into account the actual degree of 
implementation of IPRs and that index is used here.  
Unemployment and consumer price indexes indicate the degree of 
macroeconomic stability. We assume that macroeconomic stability through extending the 
horizon for entrepreneurs promotes demand for innovation.    
Compiling 25 variables for 24 countries should result in 350 observations. 
However, 18 observations or 5% of the data set are not available. We estimated missing 
data by regression estimates8. Due to the large proportion of missing data for 
Luxembourg and the possible bias of estimates we excluded it from the analysis. 
 
 Table 1: Data and sources    
 Indicator    
Absorptive capacity Abbreviation Year Source 
1 Expenditures in education in % of GDP eductgdp 1999 Eurostat 
2 S&E graduates (‰ 20-29 population) segrdpop 1999 Trendchart9 
3 Population with 3rd level education pop3educ 2001 Trendchart 
4 Participation in life-long learning (% of working age 
pop) 
llearng 2001 Trendchart 
5 Employment medium/high-tech manufacturing emplmdhtc 1999 Trendchart 
6 Employment high-tech services emphsrvc 1999 Trendchart 
R&D supply 
1 Public R&D expenditures. (% GDP) pubrd 2000 Trendchart 
2 Business R&D expenditures (% GDP) besrd 2000 Trendchart 
3 R&D personnel per labour force rdpsnlab 2000 Eurostat 
4 EPO high-tech patents (per mln pop) epopc 2000 Trendchart 
5 USPTO high-tech patens (per mln pop) usptopc 2000 USPTO 
6 Resident patents per capita respat 2000 WIPO 
Diffusion 
1 training enterprises as % of all enterprises trainent 2000 Eurostat 
2 CVT in % of labour costs of all enterprises cvtlabct 2000 Eurostat 
3 ISO 900 certifications per per capita iso9kpc 2000 ISO 
4 Internet users per 10,000 inhabitants 2001 internet 2000 ITU 
5 PC per 100 inhabitants 2001 ppcpc 2000 ITU 
6 ICT expenditures (% GDP) ictgdp 2000 Trendchart 
                                                
7 For a full description of the methodology, see Ginarte and Park (1996). 
8 We estimate missing data for cvtlabct, trainent, and emplmdhtec based on ppcpc, for llearng based on 
cvtlabct, for fdigdp based on ictgdp, for segrdpop based on isk9pc, and for iprindex based on emplmdhtec. 
All estimates are highly significant and with expected signs.  
9 EC (2002a) 
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Demand (Finance/Competition/Macroeconomic stability) 
1 Stock market capitalisation in % GDP stockmkt 1999 World Bank
2 Domestic credit provided by banking sector (%GDP) domcredi 1999 World Bank
3 Share of FDI in GDP, 1999 fdigdp 1999 UNCTAD 
4 Share of trade in GDP, 1999 tradegdp 1999 World Bank
5 Index of patent rights iprindex 1999 Ginarte and 
Pack (1997) 
and 
Smarzynska 
(2002) 
6 Registered unemployment unempl 2000 UNECE 
7 Consumer price index cpi 2000 UNECE 
 
 
Indicators of national innovation capacity from table 1 are used to calculate a 
summary innovation capacity index and its components (absorptive capacity, R&D 
supply, diffusion capacity, and strength of demand for innovation). We follow a 
procedure based on that developed by Zinnes et al. (2001) and Porter et al. (2002). We 
standardize data, multiply them by assigned weights and add together all the resulting 
products. In this way, we construct aggregate values for each of the four components of 
national innovation capacity. By summing the values of four components we calculate 
the aggregate national innovation capacity index. We assign equal weights to all 
indicators except for a few cases where indicators measure similar aspects of components 
in which case we reduce the weight of individual indicators. For absorptive capacity each 
of six indicators carries one-sixth of the weight. For R&D supply, we assign one-fifth to 
each of indicators since we treat US and European patent office patents as one indicator, 
but with a half weight assigned to each of them. We adopt the same procedure to 
calculate diffusion capacity. We assign one-fifth to each of five indicators since we treat 
Internet use and PCs per capita as one indicator with a half weight each. Unemployment 
and consumer price indexes are inversely proportional to the NIC index. We change the 
signs of these two indicators to make them, like other indicators, positively proportional. 
The summary innovation capacity index is the simple summation of four components.  
The innovation capacity index and its components are than regressed on 
manufacturing labour productivity. Data on labour productivity are Eurostat data based 
taking the EU15 index as the average.  
We also estimated weights of individual indicators based on factor analysis 
Correlation coefficient between ranking of countries based on factor analysis and based 
on simple weights as described above is 0.994. In that respect, use of factor analysis does 
not provide different estimates. However, regression estimates of indexes based on factor 
analysis on labour productivity are somewhat less significant. Hence, we do not use these 
estimates in the paper.  
 We use the indicators from table 1 for a cluster analysis. We undertake two types 
of cluster analysis using SPSS10.0 and based on Hair et al. (1998). First, we use a 
hierarchical method to identify the appropriate number of clusters. Second, we use a non-
hierarchical procedure based on number of clusters from the hierarchical analysis to 
check for consistency of clustering and robustness of results. Because our data are in 
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metric form we use squared Euclidian distance based on standardized data.  For 
hierarchical clustering we use Ward’s agglomerative method to minimize the within-
cluster differentiation and to avoid problems in ‘chaining’ of observations.10 In the 
analysis based on a hierarchical method we use the ‘stopping rule’ in order to determine 
the appropriate number of clusters. The ‘stopping rule’ allows us to determine the 
appropriate number of clusters based on changes in agglomeration coefficients, which we 
report below.11 We controlled for the existence of outliers based on the agglomeration 
schedule and observing dendograms, but we did not have to delete either a country or a 
variable to achieve this. 
In the second stage, based on the number of clusters derived from the hierarchical 
method, we profile clusters and report cluster membership and final cluster centres, and 
report the results of ANOVA for testing differences between clusters. 
 
 
4. RESULTS: R&D, NATIONAL INNOVATION CAPACITY AND 
PRODUCTIVITY IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE 
 
In the remainder of this paper we assess, first, the innovation capacity of the 
CEECs based on indicators for all four elements of the NIC framework. Second, we test 
econometrically the relationship between the summary national innovation capacity index 
and manufacturing labour productivity as well as each of its components. Third, we use 
cluster analysis to find how the aggregate innovation capacity of the enlarged EU and its 
components is structured, i.e. whether ‘East – West’ or some other more complex divide 
will be the key feature of future EU patterns of technology upgrading and growth. 
 
4.1. Innovation capacities and their components 
 National innovation capacity is a synthetic indicator comprising four components 
(absorptive capacity, R&D capacity, diffusion and demand capacities). All four 
components are equally important for technological innovation. Figure 2 and the NIC 
column in table 2 rank CEE and EU countries based on summary NIC coefficients. These 
data show three features of innovation capacities in an enlarged EU. 
 
 
                                                
10 Ward’s method calculates the sum of squares between two clusters summed over all variables. 
11 The agglomeration coefficient is the within cluster sum of squares. Small coefficients indicate that 
clusters are homogenous while a sudden jump in the value of the coefficients indicates that two very 
different clusters are merged.  
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Figure 2: National innovation capacities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Ranking by coefficients of national innovation capacity (NIC) and its 
components 
 Nat. Innov. 
Capacity 
Absorptive 
capacities 
R&D capacities Diffusion 
capacities 
Demand 
capacities 
1 RO   -5.14 EL   -1.30 RO   -1.06 RO   -1.53 RO   -1.47 
2 BG   -3.15 RO   -1.08 LV   -0.88 BG   -1.05 BG   -0.85 
3 EL   -2.75 P    -0.84 SK   -0.73 PL   -0.77 SK   -0.84 
4 PL   -2.49 BG   -0.59 BG   -0.67 EL   -0.76 PL   -0.65 
5 SK   -2.33 PL   -0.44 PL   -0.63 LT   -0.75 LV   -0.65 
6 LV   -2.19 SK   -0.42 P    -0.57 P    -0.70 LT   -0.59 
7 P    -2.14 I    -0.39 LT   -0.56 E    -0.55 SI   -0.44 
8 LT   -1.95 HU   -0.35 EE   -0.54 SI   -0.38 EL   -0.22 
9 E    -1.33 LV   -0.32 EL   -0.47 LV   -0.35 E    -0.11 
10 I    -1.11 E    -0.24 HU   -0.46 SK   -0.33 I    -0.08 
11 HU   -0.88 A    -0.22 I    -0.44 I    -0.20 CZ   -0.07 
12 SI   -0.76 CZ   -0.14 E    -0.43 HU   -0.11 P    -0.03 
13 CZ   -0.22 LT   -0.04 CZ   -0.32 A    0.13 HU   0.04 
14 EE   -0.11 SI   0.02 IRL  -0.26 EE   0.23 EE   0.12 
15 A    0.61 B    0.04 SI   0.04 B    0.24 F    0.17 
16 B    1.23 EE   0.08 B    0.11 D    0.26 FIN  0.22 
17 D    1.71 D    0.24 A    0.28 CZ   0.31 DK   0.27 
18 IRL  1.83 NL   0.26 UK   0.38 F    0.34 D    0.29 
19 F    1.86 F    0.49 NL   0.59 FIN  0.65 A    0.43 
20 DK   3.16 IRL  0.59 DK   0.79 IRL  0.72 UK   0.64 
21 UK   3.20 UK   0.98 F    0.86 DK   1.00 IRL  0.78 
22 NL   3.41 DK   1.10 D    0.92 NL   1.16 S    0.81 
23 FIN  4.20 FIN  1.29 S    2.00 UK   1.20 B    0.84 
24 S    5.35 S    1.29 FIN  2.03 S    1.25 NL   1.40 
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First, all CEECs are below the enlarged EU average NIC coefficient. In this 
respect, CEECs are clearly pushing the average NIC index downwards. In particular, the 
index is affected by Romania (-5.14) and Bulgaria (-3.15). The other seven CEECs do not 
deepen the innovation capacity gap within the enlarged EU but actually make the 
enlarged EU more homogenous.  
 
Second, bringing CEECs into the EU comparisons shows that the range of values 
of NIC coefficients is higher within the current EU than within the CEECs, i.e. 
differences in innovation capacities within the current EU are larger than differences 
within the CEECs. The EU NIC coefficient ranges from 5.35 (Sweden) to -2.75 (Greece) 
while within CEECs the range is from -5.14 (Romania) to -0.11 (Estonia). In absolute 
terms, the EU range is 8.1 index points while for the CEEC this range is 5.03 index 
points. A large range in NICs within the EU countries explains why we find a more 
complex pattern of innovation capacities within the enlarged EU. 
 
Third, the ranking of countries does not follow a simple ‘East – West’ divide but 
shows a more complex pattern. CEECs are not all grouped at the lower end of the 
spectrum, which would be followed by the Cohesion EU and then by the developed EU 
economies. Instead, South European countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy) are 
located within the CEE range of countries. NIC for Greece is below the CEE average. 
NICs of Spain and Italy are below the top three CEECs (Estonia, Czech R and Slovenia). 
In terms of income per capita, both Spain and even more so Italy are well ahead of these 
three CEECs. However, the NIC coefficient indicates the technological potential for 
catch-up, which may or may not be realized in the long-term. Figure 3 plots income per 
capita and NIC by country. Regressing NIC on income levels shows that NIC is a strong 
determinant of income per capita (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3 
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NIC explains 62% of the variation in income per capita and this impact is statistically 
significant. 
 
GDP pc = 74.58 + 9.76NIC 
SE         (4.40)   (1.67) 
t             (16.94) (5.84) 
Sig          0.000     0.000 
F-test       34.07 
Sig          0.000 
R2 = 0.79 
R2 Adj. = 0.62 
 
Figure 3 shows that most CEECs, except the richest (Slovenia) and the poorest 
(Romania) economies, have relatively higher NICs when compared to their income 
levels. In contrast, South EU economies (Portugal, Greece, Spain, Italy) have NIC 
indexes below what would be expected given their income levels. This suggests that the 
potential for catching up for the majority of CEECs to the income levels of South EU 
(Greece, Portugal, Spain) is significant. However, catching up to developed EU income 
levels would require significant improvements in national innovation capacities, i.e. it 
cannot be achieved based on the current levels of NIC. In the parlance of growth theory, 
this would suggest that the majority of CEECs have the potential for achieving 
membership of the South EU convergence club but not for catching up to the EU average. 
Figure 3 also suggests that we may see divergence within CEECs, in particular if the 
NICs for Romania and Bulgaria do not significantly improve. 
 
 Next we go on to analyze the different components of national innovation 
capacity.  
 
Absorptive capacities 
 
Table 2 and figure 4 rank countries according to the summary absorptive capacities 
index. The absorptive capacities index shows that Greece and Portugal are ranked very 
low on this scale - below the CEE average. Greece and Portugal have low ranking in 
most of the indicators of absorptive capacity, and in particular in employment in high 
tech industries and services as well as in share of science and engineering graduates 
compared to the CEE average. The high ranking of Estonia is due to high ranking on all 
six indicators of absorptive capacity. Also, Slovenia, Lithuania and Czech R rank high in 
this respect.   
Italy ranks very low on this scale.  Out of six variables Italy has a lower share 
than the CEE average in four: investments in education in GDP, share of science and 
engineering students in the population, share of population with 3rd level education, and 
share of labour force undergoing training. 
 
 A high share of employment in medium-high-tech manufacturing in the case of 
the CEECs does not mean that these economies are involved in the high-tech segments of 
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these industries. Figure 5 shows that very high shares of employment in medium-high-
tech are accompanied by very low share in GDP of business expenditure on R&D. For 
example, Hungary and Sweden have similar shares of employment in medium-high-tech 
industries but R&D intensity in the Hungarian business sector is eight times smaller in 
relative terms. Similarly, the share of employment in medium-high tech industries in 
Poland is the same as in Finland, Ireland and UK while Polish business R&D (BERD) 
intensity is very low at only 0.25% of GDP. In Cohesion EU economies, Greece and 
Portugal relative shares of employment in medium-high tech industries in Greece and 
Portugal are 3 to 4 times lower than in the CEECs. It is important to bear in mind that the 
low shares of employment in medium-high-tech industries represents a problem for 
catching up, which is easier if the country is already involved in these sectors. In such 
cases, the pattern of catching-up is predominantly intra- rather than inter-sectoral. In this 
respect, the absorptive capacity of the majority of the CEECs is favourable. Figure 6 
shows that if we exclude the most developed EU economies in terms of medium-high-
tech (Finland, Sweden, Denmark, the UK and the Netherlands) and the outlier Lithuania, 
there is positive relationship between the share of employment in medium-high tech 
sectors and the share of the labour force undergoing training. A high share of labour force 
in CEE being employed in medium-high-tech industries is an important determinant of 
the share of the labour force undergoing training irrespective of value added and R&D in 
these sectors. 
 
Figure 4: Absorptive capacities 
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Figure 5: Employment in medium-high tech manufacturing vs. BERD/GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Relationship between % employed in high tech industries and % of labor 
force involved in training 
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 R&D supply 
 
Unlike absorptive capacities, R&D supply in CEECs is clearly at the low end of the EU 
ranking. There are five CEECs (Romania, Latvia, Slovakia, Poland, and Bulgaria), which 
rank behind Portugal, the least R&D intensive EU economy. These countries are below 
the levels in the cohesion EU mainly due to the poor levels of investment (public and 
business R&D and share of R&D personnel in the labour force). After 10 years of decline 
in domestic R&D, in most CEECs levels of relative investment are clearly behind those 
of the cohesion EU economies. Czech R and Slovenia are the only CEECs that managed 
to maintain relative levels of R&D investment. This achievement, combined with a 
relatively high rate of resident patenting and relative number of researchers, puts these 
two economies in the range that is above the less developed EU economies. 
 
Figure 7: R&D capacities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diffusion capacities 
Diffusion capacities in the CEECs are widely dispersed (Figure 8). Three CEECs 
(Romania, Bulgaria and Poland) are at the low end of the European ranking. The level of 
the CEECs is dispersed between the lowest of end of the enlarged EU to very high 
diffusion capacity of Czech R, which is well above the EU average. 
The share of the working age population that participates in lifelong learning is 
used to indicate absorptive capacity. Training enterprises as a percentage of all 
enterprises and share of costs of vocational training as a percentage of labour costs, 
together with the relative number of ISO9000 certificates are taken to approximate 
diffusion capacity. Diffusion currently is closely linked to IT and hence we also use 
Internet, PCs and share of ICTs in GDP as proxies for diffusion capacity. The very high 
ranking of Estonia and the Czech Republic is due to high rates of penetration of IT as 
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well as the relatively extensive training and quality control activities (Czech R) and 
diffusion of Internet (Estonia). Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and partly Lithuania are 
behind in all these respects. For example, Lithuania, which has 45% of population with 
3rd level education, spends only 0.8% of labour costs on vocational training. Its 
absorptive capacity seems high but its low expenditure on training makes its diffusion 
capacity very weak. Slovenia, which ranks high in both R&D and absorptive capacities, 
is relatively much weaker in terms of diffusion capacity.  
 
Figure 8: Diffusion capacities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Capacity to generate demand for innovation 
 We assume that the capacity of an economy to generate demand for innovation is 
dependent, among other factors, on how well developed is its financial system, on the 
degree of competition and on the degree of macroeconomic stability. Figure 9 shows that 
the capacity to generate demand for innovation is the weakest aspect of the national 
innovation capacity of CEECs. Seven out of the ten CEECs clearly fall behind the 
cohesion EU economies in their capacity to generate demand for innovation. Estonia, 
Hungary and, to an extent, the Czech Republic, are distinctively different in this respect. 
In Estonia and Hungary, the reasons lie in their relatively developed stock markets and 
banking system and in high shares of FDI. Slovenia, which among CEECs ranks high in 
terms of absorptive capacity and particularly in terms of R&D supply, is behind its 
central European peer. This is mainly due to its undeveloped financial system and low 
share of FDI. 
 
This is the only dimension where one of the four advanced CEECs (Hungary, Czech R, 
Slovenia and Estonia) is behind the lowest ranked cohesion economy. In terms of 
absorptive, R&D and diffusion capacity at least one of the four advanced CEECs is ahead 
of the lowest ranked cohesion economy. 
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Figure 9: Demand capacities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2. National innovation capacity as determinant of productivity 
 
Figure 3 and the regression results presented in table 3 show that the high 
percentage of variation in income per capita can be explained by variations in NIC. In 
this section, we analyze the relationship between NIC and labour productivity in industry. 
Labour productivity is a far more direct measure of innovation, which shows the value-
added in purchasing power parities (PPS) which is being created by employees12. 
Simple regressions for each of the components of NIC as explanatory variables 
are all highly significant with coefficients that are higher than coefficient for simple 
regression with the aggregate NIC. The most robust is the regression that explains labour 
productivity as the variation in capacity of demand for innovation. The weakest 
regression is labour productivity, which is explained through variation of absorptive 
capacity. Variation in demand capacity explains 63% and absorptive capacity only 32% 
of the variation in NIC. 
When all four components of NIC are used to explain the levels of labour 
productivity across CEE and EU countries the overall regression is significant and adj.  
R2 is high (0.695) but three coefficients (absorption, R&D and diffusion) are either with 
the wrong sign or are insignificant. Only the demand component, when regressed jointly 
with other components, contributes significantly to explaining the variation in labour 
                                                
12 Income per capita of an economy can be influenced by rates of labour participation. The higher the 
unemployment rates, the greater the differences between GDP per capita and national productivity. Other 
factors, such as capital flows which include remittances and the age structure of the population, can also 
affect income levels. 
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productivity.13 The ranking of the CEECs in table 2 shows that they are weakest in this 
dimension of NIC. Although individual components do not show the same variance in 
NIC, with the exception of demand, they cannot offer much by way of explanation of the 
variation when in mutual interaction. This suggests that NIC is not composed of 
‘ingredients’ each simply accounting for different parts of the variation in NIC but that 
there is an interaction among the components that is more complex. The addition of 
individual components of NICs produces inconsistent regression results. Paradoxically, 
simple weighting and adding of individual variables better explains the variation in levels 
of labour productivity across countries than does adding individual components in 
regression.  
Regression results suggest several interesting things. First, NIC as a conceptual 
framework has significant power in explaining variations in labour productivity. Second, 
results from the simple regression of individual components of labour productivity, which 
are better when compared to the results of multiple regressions, show the relevance of the 
national innovation system concept. Linear combinations of individual components do 
not produce NIC as its relationships are structured through nationally specific systems. 
Third, the explanatory power of demand capacity in both simple and multiple regressions, 
in which CEECs are relatively the weakest, has strong policy implications. However, our 
demand component contains both Keynesian (financial system, unemployment), and 
monetarist features (competition and price stability) that suggest that the right policy mix 
of supply and demand measures is crucial for improved innovation capacity. 
 
 
 
                                                
13 High eigenvalues and condition indexes below 5, average VIF of 3.3885 and tolerance value 0.3217 
suggest that there is not strong multicollinearity among the four components of NIC. 
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TABLE 3: Regression analysis of relationship between labour productivity in 
manufacturing and national innovation capacity and its components   
   
Depend.var.  MLP, manufacturing labour productivity 
Indep.var.  NIC, National innovation capacity 
 ABS, Absorptive capacity 
 R&D, R&D supply 
 DIFUS, Diffusion capacity 
 DEMND, Demand for innovation 
Number of observations: 22 
Variable Constant NIC ABS R&
D 
DIFUS DEMN
D 
R sq. Adj. R-
sq. 
F-stat. Prob (F-
stat) 
Coefficient 76.06 11.80 0.592 0.572 29.08 0.000
Std. Error 5.70 2.188   
t-stat 13.34 5.392   
Prob. 0.000 0.000   
    
Coefficient 75.82 -0.237 25.3 -24.71 51.75 0.753 0.695 12.96 0.000
Std. Error 4.93 20.82 12.8
2
22.58 17.96   
t-stat 15.131 -0.011 1.97 -1.095 2.883   
Prob. 0.000 0.991 0.06
5
0.289 0.010   
    
Coefficient 75.572 34.585 0.329 0.296 9.825 0.005
Std. Error 7.325 11.034   
t-stat 10.350 3.134   
Prob. 0.000 0.005   
    
Coefficient 73.583 34.4
57
0.542 0.519 23.674 0.000
Std. Error 6.019 7.08
2
  
t-stat 12.226 4.86
6
  
Prob. 0.000 0.00
0
  
    
Coefficient 76.730 38.780 0.474 0.448 18.017 0.000
Std. Error 6.500 9.136   
t-stat 11.806 4.245   
Prob. 0.000 0.000   
    
Coefficient 76.625 50.887 0.648 0.631 36.879 0.000
Std. Error 5.301 8.379   
t-stat 14.454 6.073   
Prob. 0.000 0.000   
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4.3. Clustering of national innovation capacities in the wider Europe 
 
The ranking of CEE and EU countries based on NIC coefficients and their 
components shows that NIC in an enlarged EU do not follow a straightforward ‘East - 
West’ division, but display a more complex pattern in which cohesion EU countries are 
often mixed in with the most developed CEECs. Cluster analysis enables us to examine 
more precisely how NICs in the enlarged EU are structured. This should improve our 
understanding of the catching up potential of individual candidate countries and of the 
cohesion issues in the enlarged EU. 
Tables 4 - 8 show the results of cluster analysis of national innovation capacities 
of 10 CEE and 14 EU countries. We report the results of the hierarchical Ward method of 
clustering with agglomeration coefficients, which are used as criteria for determining the 
optimal number of clusters (stopping rule).14 We report cluster membership based on this 
method. However, as explained in the Data and Sources section we then use a non-
hierarchical clustering method to define cluster membership for the number of clusters 
determined by the Ward method. Non-hierarchical clustering is used to fine-tune the 
cluster membership. In this way, comparing the results obtained from the two methods 
can check consistency of cluster membership. However, we take results of the non-
hierarchical method as being final. We report the distances between final clusters in order 
to find out how close or far apart individual clusters are from one another. Table 4 shows 
the means for each variable within each final cluster and is useful to describe the 
attributes of each cluster. The last two columns in this table present the results of the F-
test and give us a rough idea of its statistical significance.15  
Table 4 shows the results of clustering of national innovation capacities in the 
enlarged EU. We obtain three clusters of countries in the enlarged EU. Two clusters 
which comprised all CEE and cohesion EU have been ‘fine tuned’ into three clusters 
where EU high tech ‘North’ formed its owned cluster. Also, four central European 
countries form another cluster with the EU6.   
                                                
14 The agglomeration coefficient is the within cluster sum of squares. Small coefficients indicate that 
clusters are homogenous while a sudden jump indicates that two different clusters are merged. The rule is 
to take as the number of clusters the number before a significant jump in the agglomeration coefficient.   
15 The F test is the ratio between cluster variance and error variance. A large (significant) F value indicates 
variables that are important for separating clusters while small (insignificant) values indicate variables that 
are not very useful for identifying cluster membership. However, because a non-hierarchical clustering 
algorithm is designed to minimize within-cluster variability, the F statistics cannot be interpreted in the 
same way as in a traditional ANOVA. This means that the significance values are not reliable estimates of 
the probability associated with the hypothesis of no effect for a particular variable. These values should be 
used only as guidelines. 
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Table 4  
Clustering of national innovation capacities 
Hierachical Ward method 
Number of 
clusters 
Agglomeratio
n coefficient 
Percentage change in coeffcient to next level 
1 599.87 
2 359.66 66.79%
3 299.99 19.89%
4 261.68 14.64%
5 231.14 13.21%
6 201.33 14.81%
7 174.74 15.22%
  
Cluster membership 
Cluster 1 CEE10 + EU4 (EL, E, I, P)
Cluster 2 EU10 
  
Non-hierarchical (K-means) clustering 
Cluster 1 CEE6 + EU3 (BG, LT, LV, PL, RO, SK, + E, EL, P) 
Cluster 2 EU3 FIN, S, DK 
Cluster 3 EU6 + CEE4 (A, B, D, F, I, IRL + CZ, EE, HU, SL)  
  
Distances between final clusters 
 1 2 3
1  10.073 4.947
2 10.073 6.293
3 4.947 6.293
  
Final cluster centers ANOVA 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 F Sig. 
eductgdp -0.45 1.89 -0.14 11.834 0
segrdpop -0.52 0.68 0.22 2.343 0.121
pop3educ -0.25 1 -0.06 1.868 0.179
llearng -0.49 1.82 -0.08 10.809 0.001
emplhtec -0.82 0.52 0.49 7.152 0.004
emphsrvc -0.99 1.45 0.38 24.63 0.000
pubrd -0.81 1.55 0.22 13.98 0.000
besrd -0.82 1.88 0.14 24.599 0.000
rdpsnlab -0.71 1.85 0.07 17.108 0.000
epopc -0.67 2.01 0 21.564 0.000
usptopc -0.72 2.2 -0.01 41.846 0.000
respat -0.72 1.92 0.06 19.768 0.000
trainent -1 1.4 0.4 24.643 0.000
cvtlabct -0.89 1.66 0.25 21.718 0.000
iso9kpc -0.83 0.42 0.52 7.497 0.003
internet -0.89 1.65 0.25 21.306 0.000
ppcpc -0.93 1.63 0.28 23.94 0.000
 25
ictgdp -0.69 0.7 0.34 4.403 0.025
stockmkt -0.45 1.29 0.01 4.189 0.029
domcredi -0.55 -0.04 0.42 2.692 0.091
fdigdp -0.41 -0.13 0.34 1.43 0.262
tradegdp -0.82 0.55 0.48 7.077 0.004
iprindex -0.89 0.46 0.55 9.68 0.001
unempl -0.68 0.54 0.38 4.17 0.030
cpi -0.4 0.36 0.21 1.168 0.330
 
The most surprising result of clustering NICs in an enlarged EU is (a) the splitting 
of advanced and less advanced CEECs into two groups and their grouping into two 
different EU groups, and (b) that the top three EU economies in terms of NIC are 
Finland, Sweden and Denmark, which form a separate cluster. Three EU cohesion 
economies (Spain, Portugal and Greece) with six of the less advanced EU economies 
(Slovakia, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Bulgaria) form a cluster. The 
distinguishing characteristic of this group is negative values on all 25 indicators that form 
NIC.16 The four advanced CEECs (Czech R, Slovenia, Estonia and Hungary) with the six 
EU economies, represent another separate cluster. When compared to the most advanced 
EU (cluster 2) and the least advanced group (cluster 1) this group has a mixed profile.  
When cluster 1 (less advanced EU and CEE) is compared to cluster 3 (average EU 
and advanced CEE) the biggest advantages of the latter are in the dimensions of demand 
and diffusion while differences are much less distinct for R&D and absorption factors.17 
The average distance between the top EU group (cluster 2) and cluster 3 (average EU and 
top 4 CEECs) is bigger (6.293) than the distance between this latter group and cluster 1 
(cohesion EU and less developed CEE group) (4.947). This shows that NICs within the 
current EU are quite polarized and that the enlargement of EU based on the four 
advanced CEECs will not lead to divergence but instead will make EU NICs more 
homogenous. 
Clustering of the most developed CEECs with the average EU group shows that 
the former have significant potential for technological catch-up. The clustering of the less 
developed CEECs with the three EU cohesion economies says little about their 
technological potential and a great deal about the big gap in NIC between the cohesion 
EU and the EU average group (Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, Italy and Ireland). 
It is interesting that neither share of FDI in GDP nor price stability significantly 
contribute to differentiation of countries in clusters. The high share of FDI in CEECs and 
the relative closeness of some EU economies to FDI, like Italy and Greece, explain this 
situation. Also, relatively low inflation in CEECs, whose economic policy strongly 
favours price stability, does not clearly differentiate the countries in the three groups. 
 
Next we cluster separately each of the components of NICs.  
                                                
16 Unemployment and the price index have unchanged signs and hence positive values denote negative 
contributions to NIC.  
17 Two of six indicators of absorptive capacity (share of science and engineering students in the population 
and share of population with 3rd level of education) do not contribute significantly to clustering which 
suggests that differences across the three groups in terms of absorptive capacity are also not clearly 
differentiated. 
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Table 4 suggests that the clustering of absorptive capacity variables does not 
strongly differentiate CEE from EU countries. Table 5 shows that in terms of absorptive 
capacities enlarged EU is the least differentiated. In terms of absorptive capacities, six 
EU countries are more similar to the CEE than to the top EU7 (DK, F, FIN, IRL, NL, S, 
UK). Also, distances between these two clusters are the least among four components of 
NIC. 
 
Table 5 
Clustering of absorptive capacities 
Hierachical Ward method 
Number 
of clusters 
Agglomeration 
coefficient 
Percentage change in coeffcient to 
next level 
 
1 143.96 - 
2 95.91 50.10%
3 75.51 27.03%
4 60.79 24.21%
5 46.48 30.77%
6 38.81 19.78%
7 31.82 21.96%
 
Cluster membership 
Cluster 1 CEE10 + EU8 (P, NL, I, EL, E, D, B, A)  
Cluster 2 EU6 (F, FIN, IRL, S, UK, DK) 
 
Non-hierarchical (K-means) clustering 
Cluster 1 CEE10 + EU7 (A, B, D, E, EL, I, P) 
Cluster 2 EU7 (DK, F, FIN, IRL, NL, S, UK) 
 
Distances between final clusters 
 1 2
1 3.167
2 3.167
 
Final cluster centers ANOVA 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 F Sig. 
eductgdp -0.35 0.84 9.048 0.006
segrdpop -0.43 1.06 18.747 0.000
pop3educ -0.27 0.67 4.969 0.036
llearng -0.43 1.04 17.769 0.000
emplhtec -0.11 0.27 0.679 0.419
emphsrvc -0.52 1.27 42.823 0.000
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Netherlands is the only country that changed membership from hierarchical to 
nonhierarchical clustering. A joint clustering of the CEECs with the EU6 results from the 
combination of certain features of their absorptive capacity: either from high share of the 
population with 3rd level education, high investment in education and/or high share of the 
workforce employed in high tech sectors.  
Clustering based on six variables of absorptive capacity shows that only one of 
them (share of employment in medium and high tech sectors) does not contribute 
significantly to clustering. 
 The top EU7 economies in terms of absorptive capacities have positive values for 
all six variables while the first cluster shows negative values for all except share of 
employment in high tech sectors. We have already pointed out that the CEECs have a 
relatively high share of the workforce employed in low value added segments of high 
tech sectors. It is this ‘unusual’ structural feature of the CEE that produces insignificant 
coefficient for this variable in table 5 . 
The clustering of R&D variables in table 6 shows that the enlarged EU is the most 
polarized in terms of capacity for knowledge generation. It is the only component where 
hierarchal method has produced four clusters, which through fine-tuning are reduced to 
three clusters.  
In terms of knowledge generation EU is split on EU ‘North’ (Sweden, Finland), 
EU ‘South’ (Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal) and on EU ‘Middle Earth’ with Slovenia 
as the only CEE that is in this respect closer to the EU average than to the rest of the 
CEE. Distance of the EU medium group from the EU ‘North’ (4.883) is bigger than the 
distance to cluster 3 (CEE9 and EU cohesion) (2.817). All variables contribute 
significantly to cluster membership. 
 
 
 
Table 6 
  
Clustering of R&D supply capacities 
Hierachical Ward method  
Number 
of clusters 
Agglomeration 
coefficient 
Percentage change in coeffcient to next level 
1 144.05 -  
2 68.85 109.24%  
3 26.83 156.61%  
4 19.07 40.70%  
5 14.20 34.30%  
6 11.70 21.35%  
7 9.53 22.77%  
   
Cluster membership  
Cluster 1 CEE9 + EU4 
(I, E, P, EL) 
(CEEC  + E, EL, I, P) )  
Cluster 2 EU4 + CEE1 (A, B, IRL, UK) + SI  
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Cluster 3 EU4 (D, DK, F, NL)  
Cluster 4 EU2 (FIN, S)  
   
Non-hierarchical (K-means) 
clustering 
 
Cluster 1 EU 2 (S, FIN)  
Cluster 2 EU7 + CEE1 (UK, F, NL, DK, D, B, A) + SI  
Cluster 3 CEE9 + EU5 (CEEC  + E, EL, I, P, IRL)  
   
Distances between Final Cluster Centers  
 1 2 3  
1  4.883 7.56  
2 4.883 2.817  
3 7.56 2.817  
   
Final cluster centers ANOVA  
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 F Sig. 
pubrd 1.89 0.69 -0.67 26.255 0.00 
besrd 2.52 0.55 -0.68 91.424 0.00 
rdpsnlab 2.18 0.58 -0.64 30.987 0.00 
epopc 2.89 0.23 -0.54 80.265 0.00 
usptopc 2.78 0.42 -0.64 151.234 0.00 
respat 2.38 0.53 -0.64 43.262 0.00 
 
Table 4 shows that differences in diffusion capacities between the less developed 
CEECs and the three cohesion EU economies (cluster 1) and the top EU3 (Finland, 
Sweden and Denmark) (cluster 2) are consistent with opposite signs and values. The 
intermediate cluster group 3 (the four advanced CEECs and the 6 average EU) all have 
positive signs in terms of diffusion capacity but with exception of ISO9090 certificates 
the values of all variables are lower than in the top EU group. 
Final, non-hierarchical clustering of only diffusion capacities (table 7) 
distinguishes two groups of countries. CEECs are again split into two groups, advanced 
and less advanced CEECs; while the EU countries are also split into 2 clusters. This split 
is caused by on one side cohesion EU (Spain, Greece, Portugal and Italy) and on the other 
by developed diffusion capacities of Estonia and Czech Republic. 
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Table 7   
Clustering of diffusion capacities  
Hierachical Ward method 
Number 
of clusters 
Agglomeratio
n coefficient 
Percentage change in coeffcient to next level 
1 143.98 -  
2 69.24 107.94%  
3 50.29 37.69%  
4 41.36 21.57%  
5 32.94 25.57%  
6 25.57 28.85%  
7 19.37 32.01%  
   
Cluster membership  
Cluster 1 CEE8 + EU4 (BG, LT, PL, RO + EL, E, I, P)  
Cluster 2 EU4 + CEE2 (F, A, B, D + EE, 
CZ) 
 
Cluster 3 EU 6 (DK, FIN, IRL, S, NL, UK)  
   
Non-hierarchical (K-means) clustering  
Cluster 1 CEE8 + EU4 (All CEECs except CZ and EE + EL, E, P, I) 
Cluster 2 EU10 + 
CEE2 
(EU10 + CZ, EE)  
   
Distances between Final Cluster Centers  
Cluster 1 2  
1  3.529  
2 3.529  
   
Final cluster centers ANOVA  
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 F Sig.  
Trainent -0.88 0.88 76.994 0.000  
Cvtlabct -0.78 0.78 34.085 0.000  
iso9kpc -0.6 0.6 12.264 0.002  
Internet -0.67 0.67 18.326 0.000  
Ppcpc -0.77 0.77 32.157 0.000  
Ictgdp -0.57 0.57 10.505 0.004  
 
The distance between cluster centers of the two groups are relatively small and 
are similar to distances for absorptive capacities. All variables significantly contribute to 
clustering. 
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Initially, a hierarchical clustering of capacities for generating demand for 
innovation is the one that clearly separates the CEECs from the EU economies (table 8). 
Fine-tuning of the 3-cluster solution via non-hierarchical clustering shows Romania to be 
significantly different from the rest of the CEE. Undeveloped stock market, but low share 
of domestic credit and high inflation can explain much of this distinctive position of 
Romania.  
Fine-tuning of the initial three-cluster solution has kept all the CEE, except 
Romania, together. In terms of diffusion capacities the CEECs seems to be the most 
homogenous. 
However, the most surprising is clustering of Finland in a group with the CEEC 
and the cohesion EU. High share of stock market, low share of domestic credit but also 
low share of FDI makes position of Finland in terms of demand capacity closer to the 
cohesion EU than to the rest of the EU. However, distance between this group and the 
rest of the EU is relatively small. 
 
 
 
Table 8  
Clustering of demand for innovation  
Hierachical Ward method 
Number 
of clusters 
Agglomeration 
coefficient 
Percentage change in coefficient to next 
level 
1 167.88 - 
2 122.48 37.06%
3 100.32 22.10%
4 80.15 25.16%
5 65.87 21.67%
6 54.23 21.48%
7 46.50 16.62%
  
Cluster membership 
Cluster 1 CEE10 All 
CEECs 
Cluster 2 EU9  (A, D, DK, E, EL, F, FIN, I, P) 
Cluster 3 EU5 (B, IRL, NL, S, UK) 
  
Non-hierarchical (K-means) 
clustering 
Cluster 1 RO 
Cluster 2 EU8 (A, B, D, DK, IRL, NL, S, UK) 
Cluster 3 CEE9 + CEE6 (All CEE except RO + E, EL, F, FIN, I, P) 
  
Distances between Final Cluster Centers 
 1 2 3
1  6.534 4.98
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2 6.534 2.752
3 4.98 2.752
  
  
Final cluster centers ANOVA 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 F test Sig. 
stockmkt -0.95 0.42 -0.16 1.351 0.281
domcredi -1.44 0.89 -0.38 8.324 0.002
fdigdp -0.68 0.4 -0.17 1.05 0.368
tradegdp -1.33 1.02 -0.46 12.791 0.000
iprindex -0.84 0.76 -0.35 4.533 0.023
unempl -0.47 0.9 -0.45 7.071 0.004
cpi -4.56 0.37 0.11 117.67 0.000
 
 
Individual variables have expected signs and values. However, FDI and stock 
market variables do not contribute significantly to clustering in three groups. When 
compared to the CEECs, the average value of FDI for the EU12 is below the average for 
the CEECs. A great openness of CEEC to FDI has made them extremely dependent on 
foreign capital and technology which has produced marked effects on market competition 
and market structure. A high share of FDI inflows does not necessarily correlate with 
high NIC which justifies our interpretation of FDI as a proxy for competition rather than 
for technology or capital inflow. However, as might be expected, the effects of FDI on 
competition can be ambiguous because of the domestic vs. export orientation of FDI.  
In summary, clustering of capacities for demand for innovation shows that in this 
respect CEECs are the most homogenous. This may not be so much problem for the less 
developed CEE but is probably for the advanced CEECs which have been significantly 
ahead of the other CEECs on other three dimension of NIC. Although demand conditions 
for innovation are unfavourable across the entire region, even in this respect EU cohesion 
economies are more similar to the CEE than to the rest of the EU. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
1. National innovation capacity provides a robust conceptual framework for 
understanding the factors that determine productivity and technical change. This 
intermediate line in the research falls between the overly aggregate approaches of 
new and neo-classical growth theory, on one hand, and case study and exclusively 
micro approaches, on the other. By using a large number of indicators from a system 
of innovation framework perspective the NIC framework shows the multi-
dimensional nature of innovation capacity while keeping the analysis at the macro 
level. Following the national innovation system approach we organized the indicators 
into four groups (R&D supply, absorptive capacity, diffusion and demand). What 
underpins this grouping is the assumption that growth and innovation capacity of an 
economy depends not only on the supply of R&D but also on the capability to absorb 
and diffuse technology and demand for its generation and utilization. 
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2. NIC as conceptual framework has significant power to explain the variations in 
labour productivity. Individual components of NIC also have significant explanatory 
power for labour productivity. However, the poor regression results obtained when 
individual components are grouped point to the relevance of national systems of 
innovation for understanding how different dimensions of NIC interact. 
3. When CEECs are included in the current EU they shift the index of NIC downwards. 
However, the range of values of NIC coefficients is higher within the current EU than 
within the CEECs. A wide range of NICs across the EU explains why we will find a 
more complex pattern of innovation capacities within the enlarged EU. The ranking 
of countries does not follow a simple ‘East – West’ divide. In terms of NICs, the 
wider Europe is structured into three groups of which CEECs are split across two, the 
less developed and medium developed EU groups. The less advanced CEECs have 
NICs that cluster them with the cohesion EU while the four advanced CEECs are 
similar to the medium EU group. Clustering of capacity for demand for innovation 
shows CEECs to be the most homogenous group but also the weakest. Demand 
conditions for innovation are unfavourable across the entire region. South European 
countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy) are located within the CEE range of 
countries. This ranking raises interesting issues regarding the differences between 
income per capita levels and NICs and raises interesting issues regarding the potential 
for catching up by the advanced CEECs to the income levels of the cohesion EU.  
4. What distinguishes the advanced from the less advanced CEECs is better capacity of 
the advanced CEECs in absorptive and R&D capabilities; in terms of diffusion, and 
particularly demand capacities, differences are smaller. The potential for catch-up to 
the levels of income of the cohesion EU is very high for the four highest level CEECs 
in terms of NIC (Estonia, Slovenia, Czech R and Hungary). Clustering analysis shows 
that in terms of NIC the four advanced CEECs are actually more similar to the 
‘average EU’ group than to the cohesion EU group. Relatively advanced absorptive 
and diffusion capacities, of advanced CEECs, and poor levels (except in Slovenia) of 
R&D capacity, seem to be decisive for their clustering close to medium level EU 
countries in terms of NIC. The NICs of the less advanced CEECs are more similar to 
those of the cohesion EU than those of the cohesion EU countries are to the medium 
and developed EU. However, in terms of levels of individual indicators most of the 
less advanced CEECs are behind the cohesion EU.  
5. CEECs are relatively well placed within the wider Europe in terms of absorptive 
capacity, which is the combined result of education and training indicators and high 
share of employment in high tech sectors. If we take similarity to EU NICs as the 
main criterion than the policy priorities for the CEE in order of priority would be: 
demand, R&D and diffusion. However, analysis shows that only nationally specific 
policy implications can be analytically based. Points of departure for national policies 
are discrepancies in the strength of individual dimensions of NICs. For example, 
Slovenia is relatively much better in terms of R&D and absorptive capacities than in 
diffusion and demand capacities. Estonia is the only CEEC with positive coefficients 
for both demand and diffusion. Although it is weak in R&D, Estonia has the best 
potential for catching up if we take NIC as the criterion.  
6. From a policy perspective the NIC framework suggests that innovation is a 
multidimensional and multilevel activity. The policy focus should be on all four 
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dimensions. For example, it would be undesirable to focus on absorption to the extent 
that overall R&D stock is reduced. Countries that spend more on R&D are able to 
take greater advantage of foreign technology. Our analysis suggests that the CEECs’ 
absorptive capacities are relatively better than their current R&D capacities which, 
after 10 years of weak demand, have become a bottleneck in the bid to improve NIC. 
Countries that are further behind the technology frontier have more to gain from 
increasing their R&D efforts since these efforts are more likely to allow them to 
capture international spillovers from technologically advanced countries. In the 
context of CEE, this would mean that strengthening of weak R&D should be given 
much more priority by policy makers in these countries than is currently the case. 
However, weak demand for innovation is the key obstacle to increased R&D: thus the 
situation cannot be rectified by increasing public R&D spending without there being 
increased demand for innovation from the business sector.  
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